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ABSTRACT 
Major uprates of process compressor train performance can 
be achieved utilizing the existing machinery. The following is 
a broad overview of a project to revamp two identical compres­
sor trains to achieve levels well over original design flow. Sig­
nificant internal modifications to an air compressor, a process 
compressor, and an expander have achieved most of our planned 
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flow increase. The first train was modified in April 1986, and 
the second was modified in August 1986. An additional extensive 
uprate of our existing steam turbine driver to almost double 
the design power rating will push performance even beyond 
the envisioned maximum rate. 
This project was developed and managed by plant engineers. 
This paper documents the development, manufacturing, and 
startup phases of both the performance uprate as well as a seal 
system redesign for increased reliability. The mechanical rede­
sign was primarily done by the original equipment manufactur­
ers (OEMs). Contributions from corporate specialists, after mar­
ket suppliers and independent consultants were also vital to 
the project's success. Measures taken to ensure the performance 
of the contractors and confidence in the reliability of the end 
products are described. The mechanical performance is up to 
company expectations now, but not without first overcoming a 
few obstacles. Actual operating rates are beyond expectations, 
primarily due to the effect of liquid carryover into the process 
compressor. Troubleshooting and performance testing techniques 
are described. 
INTRODUCTION 
Two identical compressor trains are in a continuous full pro­
duction mode at a Green Lake, Texas chemical plant. The pro­
cess is an exothermic reaction of air, ammonia, and propylene, 
which not only creates the main product, acrylonitrile, but also 
generates large quantities of high pressure steam. This steam 
drives both compressor trains as well as a turbogenerator. Each 
train is composed of a steam turbine, an air compressor, a 
process compressor, and an expander (Figure 1). The process 
compressor has two sections with an intercooler. The train is 
mounted on concrete pedestals with downward piping connec­
tions for ease of maintenance. A common lube oil skid services 
the whole train. The unit has been in operation for over five 
years. The equipment is completely instrumented with vibra­
tion probes and bearing imbedded thermocouples. Both process 
and surge control are maintained by our plant process computer. 
The train is inline, driven with 30 in spacer, diaphragm cou­
plings between each case. Spare rotors are stored for each 
machine and an entire spare process compressor is kept ready 
for an emergency changeout. The air compressor employes 
suction throttling and discharge blowoff for surge control. The 
process compressor has suction throttling and two independent 
recycle loops to prevent surge conditions. Production rates are 
pushed to the limit at all times. Shutdowns are infrequent and 
kept to the shortest duration possible. The company operating 
philosophy is based on squeezing as much production as possi­
ble from the existing equipment. The online operating 
philosophy requires the most cost effective, reliable method of 
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increasing production with the existing equipment and the shor­
test production disruption. 
.,, 
Figure 1. Compressor T rain Process Flow Diagram. 
HISTORY 
The compressors were designed and specified in 1978, and 
built in 1979 and 1980. Initial designs were concerned with 
both the quality and quantity of steam available for startup and 
the ability to operate at reduced rates without the gas expander. 
The steam turbine was sized to exceed the required horsepower 
requirement for the train at rated conditions. 
Precommissioning of the compressor trains began in the sum­
mer of 1981. Startup in December 1981, went smoothly with 
one exception. The gas expanders all experienced blade failures 
on the rotating third stage, due to vibratory fatigue. A success­
fully redesigned blade with a thicker profile, fewer stress risers, 
and other design improvements was quickly provided by the 
OEM and installed. 
The following years of operation have been without major 
problems. However, a number of significant problems present­
ing some interesting challenges to plant maintenance engineer­
ing have developed. The process compressor had a tendency 
to accumulate hard friable solids in low gas velocity "dead" 
spaces. These solids built up, eventually contacting the rotor 
and causing wear damage to the rotor labyrinth seal areas. Seal 
failure occurred periodically. This problem has been solved by 
a seal redesign described later. Another problem, liquid slug­
ging, has occurred only once. The suspected cause was accumu­
lated water in the process compressor inlet lines, slugging the 
compressor on startup or at low speed. The coupling between 
the air and process compressor failed after the coupling hubs 
had spun and galled to the shafts. Later a slight bow with a 
torsional twist was discovered in both compressor shafts. 
The steam turbine experienced recurrent split-line leaks in 
the high pressure section of the case. Online leak repair was 
only partially successful. The turbines have seen an intermittent 
subsynchronous vibration at the natural frequency of the rotor. 
This has been attributed to seal rubbing. In addition, a second 
subsynchronous vibration component visible in the spectrum 
analysis and evidenced by a slowly bouncing vibration monitor 
needle had appeared. Increasing the crush on the spherical 
seat of the self-aligning, tilt-pad bearings by 0.002 in over the 
manufacturer's value has solved the problem. 
The compressor trains have been fairly reliable overall. The 
extra capacity capability put into the steam turbines during the 
design stage allowed the plant to run at rates slightly exceeding 
design for the past several years. It was a desire to further 
increase production that germinated the eventual revamp of 
the machinery to safely accommodate to the new high flow of 
design rates. 
REVAMP 
Operation of the compressor train was repeatedly pushed to 
the known operating "limits." Several of these "limits," when 
investigated with the manufacturer were well below the actual 
design limitations. After removing as many artificial limitations 
as possible, the plant engineers were faced with a 550 psi 
maximum allowable, turbine, first stage, pressure limitation. 
At this point, the expander flow limits had been exceeded. The 
expander recovered about 62 percent of the power provided 
to drive the process compressor. The high inlet pressures re­
quired to pass the required flow across the expander was nearing 
the pressure rating limitations of some of the upstream pressure 
vessels. The process system was capable of passing flow far in 
excess of what the expander could handle. 
Once the limits of the equipment had been reached, the 
focusing switched to the complete system, and it was found 
that the horsepower in the process compressor and the expan­
der were not effectively utilized. The plant engineering staff 
performed tests on the process system to derive pressure vs 
capacity relationships. They pointed out that a significant por­
tion of the horsepower used to compress the process gas was 
unnecessary. Using this data, a project was proposed that would 
use less power to achieve the same production rate. The power 
savings translated into lower steam consumption at our 
maximum throughput. Excess steam could be put through an 
existing turbine generator. The projected increase in electrical 
revenues was the initial basis for project justification. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In defining the scope of modifications to the compressor 
train, several objectives were established: reuse of the existing 
cases; achievement of the highest capacity possible; using the 
existing cases; maintain minimum turndown; ability to meet 
startup conditions; dynamically stable revamped rotors as 
proven by computer simulations; and, torsionally stable train 
as proven by a computer simulation. 
The first step in redesigning the compressors and expander 
was definition of the pressure drop and flow requirements. 
Tests were performed to develop the pressure requirements 
at various production rates. Other tests were used to derive 
empirical formulas for the pressure losses through the piping 
and equipment. From this data, an ideal expander pressure 
versus flow curve was developed. 
Work started with the expander manufacturer to define the 
limits of gas flow through the existing casing with decreased 
inlet pressure and increased inlet temperature conditions. The 
OEM's design investigation revealed that the existing casing 
could be used to give the desired flow at the specified pressure 
and temperature. New internals and rotor would be required. 
There would be an efficiency loss with an associated degree of 
uncertainty due to the very high gas inlet velocities. 
During this development work, plant engineers were en­
gaged simultaneously in discussions with industry consultants, 
the OEMs, some independent repair shops, and other manufac­
turers about their ability to support this project. A need was 
determined to evaluate the industry alternatives, and see if 
there were any better ideas in order to be assured of getting 
a fair price. Based on this evaluation, the company established 
confidence in the OEMs' abilities, ideas, and the cost fairness. 
In the final analysis, the OEMs were considered best able to 
support this project. They had a primary advantage over other 
competitors, due to their detailed knowledge of the existing 
machine internals. Using their input, rough definition of the 
project and its scope were obtained. This included the total 
replacement of all internals in the air compressor, the process 
compressor, and the gas expander. 
MAJOR REVAMP AND RETROFIT OF IDENTICAL COMPRESSOR TRAINS 107 
The OEMs were contracted to provide a complete design 
package. This included final internal component selection, hy­
draulic performance, mechanical design stability, a firm scope 
of supply and cost quotation. These contracts were negotiated 
incorporating a defined scope for each study, the specific results 
to be obtained, a maximum cost exposure, and a provision for 
crediting the cost of the studies towards any hardware purchase. 
Contracting the design work to the OEMs assured them that 
this project had the plant management's support, and, there­
fore, that the engineers were not asking them to perform free 
engineering development work. 
Throughout the conception, definition, execution, and oper­
ational evaluation of this project, a number of different re­
sources were consulted. Those resources included in-house 
technical specialists, the original equipment manufacturers, 
other equipment manufacturers, independent repair shops, and 
independent engineering consultants. The plant engineers felt 
it was important to maintain outside and independent industrial 
contacts, to increase the number of options available and to 
ensure the quality of the final product. 
For each vendor, a complete and detailed scope of supply was 
submitted as a part of the purchase order for the engineering 
studies and the revamped hardware. These scopes of supply 
were invaluable as a communication tool between buyer and 
seller and between engineer and purchasing agent. Each scope 
was developed or reviewed in joint meetings which started 
with a statement of intent. The scope of supply was the final 
word clarifying the company's needs and the vendor's respon­
sibility as manufacturing problems developed. The various 
scopes also aided project closeout as a checklist to ensure all 
the expected material, including the consumable spare parts, 
critical speed analyses, drawings, etc., was supplied as re­
quested. Outside independent consultants were employed to 
review the OEM' s engineering work in areas considered critical 
or as having high potential risk. In this project, no discrepancies 
were uncovered; however, it was felt that independent analysis 
of critical items is a necessary ingredient for ensuring high 
reliability of the final product. 
STEAM TURBINE 
Original performance guarantee point of the steam turbine 
was just under 6000 hp at 4854 rpm. The steam conditions 
were rated at 650 psig, 625°F inlet to 55 psig exhaust into the 
plant low pressure steam header. 
The turbine itself is a ten stage, multivalve, noncondensing 
steam turbine. It has an electronic governor with hydraulic 
actuator control. Overspeed trips are both mechanical and elec­
tronic. The bearings are all tilt pad, lubricated by a common 
lube oil console. Imbedded thermocouples in the pads provide 
temperature information. Proximetry probes send vibration sig­
nals to a control room monitor. 
The steam turbine was not modified during the April revamp. 
After the startup of the revamped first train, it was determined 
that more driving horsepower was desired. Future uprate of 
the steam turbine to well over double its original rating had 
been discussed with the manufacturer. An up rate of this mag­
nitude would require a complete new set of internals. Modifi­
cations may include reducing the number of stages from ten 
to four or five. In addition, blades would be lengthened to fill 
the maximum internal diameter of 25 in from the current 20 
in diameter. The shaft may be salvageable; but that is doubtful, 
since the wider wheels require longer keys. A larger trip and 
throttle valve may also have been required. The major design 
constraints are the first stage pressure limitation and the inter­
nal diameter of the case. There would be some efficiency loss. 
These modifications are major and very expensive. In addition, 
process engineers felt that other areas of the plant needed 
debottlenecking prior to achieving maximum compressor train 
output. The major turbine uprate was postponed. 
As a temporary measure, the manufacturer suggested remov­
ing the second stage blading and diaphragms. Although this 
measure sacrificed an estimated 1.5 percent efficiency, it al­
lowed considerably higher flow, and therefore, higher horse­
power within the first stage case pressure limit. This step was 
in line with desired horsepower supply requirements and cer­
tainly within the budget. Temporary horsepower ratings were 
at 9000 hp at 5200 rpm. The plant is currently exceeding that 
quoted rating by an additional ten percent. First stage case 
pressure has dropped to about 530 psig. 
The manufacturing step of the uprate was simple and quick. 
Airfoils were machined off and the rotor was rebalanced. Blade 
roots were left in the disk to allow reblading of the stage, if 
necessary. 
Valve cams on the first steam turbine were reset to new 
positions per the manufacturer's instructions. Valves on the 
second steam turbine were not reset. At startup, it was possible 
to pass more steam through the second turbine. Upon inspec­
tion, valves on the first train did not open fully on full governor 
travel. The cams were reset again to the original position to 
allow full steam admission. 
One particularly troublesome problem was finally solved. 
Previously, steam leaks on the casing horizontal splitline at the 
high pressure end had been very troublesome. Leak repair was 
done while operating with a sealant injection into the leaking 
area by a contractor. The frequency of repair was unacceptable, 
as was the possibility of a shutdown in the event of a large 
unstoppable leak. Four months prior to the August shutdown, 
a complete strategy had been developed for eliminating the 
leaks. First, the splitline was inspected and honed flat to elimi­
nate all burrs, scratches, and raised surfaces. A "wire drawn" 
erosion line was carefully welded and honed flat. A lead wire 
check was then performed. Shim stock, 0.005 in thick, and one 
amp lead fuse wire, 0.015 in thick, were located along the 
splitline. The top half of the case was then installed with one 
third of the bolts tightened to approximately one half of the 
required torque load. The lid was then removed and the lead 
wire thickness was checked with a micrometer. Forty points 
were checked with 90 percent being within one thousandth of 
the shim stock thickness. Maximum deviation was only 0.003 
in. The manufacturer's allowable deviation was 0.005 in. Satis­
fied that the flatness was not the problem, the plant engineers 
used asbestos tape and triple boiled linseed oil to seal the 
splitline and replaced the lid. 
All new B-16 grade bolts were then installed in both cases. 
The rounded ends of the bolts were machined flat, top and 
bottom. The case was then reassembled. A contract bolting 
service company was hired to hydraulically tighten the bolts. 
An ultrasonic transducer was used to check for proper bolt 
tension. The manufacturer's recommended tension of 60,000 
psi was used for all bolts. Two teams of service representatives 
started on the low pressure end, simultaneously bolting each 
side until finished. Previously, millwrights with hammer 
wrenches just beat the bolts as tight as they could get them. 
Low profile hydraulic wrenches provided even torque when 
ultrasonically monitored. To date, only one minor steam leak 
has developed. The even application of the specified torque to 
the new bolts has apparently solved the problem. 
AIR COMPRESSOR 
The original performance criteria delivered several thousand 
pounds per minute of atmospheric air to our process system at 
about 30 psia discharge pressure. The rated condition was 105 
percent mass flow, although the plant often exceeded 125 per-
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cent mass flow. The new performance targets for the compressor 
train were based on maximizing the mass flow of air to the 
reactor. 
The air compressor is of the double flow design having one 
36 in discharge and two 36 in suction lines (Figure 2). The case 
is rated for a maximum air flow of 100,000 icfm. It is supported 
on four integral feet, two fixed and two sliding, which allow 
for axial expansion. A total of six closed welded impellers, three 
to a side, had diameters of 36, 34 and 36 in, respectively, and 
were made of 4330 alloy steel. Impellers are keyed and have 
a light shrink fit. The shaft is made of 4340 steel, has a 101 in 
bearing span and an 8 7/8 in diameter. Shaft sleeves are 12 
percent to 14 percent chrome steel and the seals are of the 
aluminum labyrinth type. All of the bearings are tilt pad type 
and pressure lubricated. The case is cast iron, ASTMA247 Class 
40 and the diaphragms are cast iron, ASTM-A278 Class 30 
material. The coupling is a dry diaphragm type with a 30 in 
spacer. It has a 2.0 service factor. The hubs are taper fit and 
hydraulically mounted. Although the coupling guard is non-lub­
ricated, it is totally enclosed and open to oil spray from the 
bearing housings. These coupling guards have been a source 
of nuisance oil leaks since the original startup. The assembled 
compressor weighs in at 50 tons. 
Figure 2. Air Compressor Cross Section. 
Uprated performance of the air compressor is the primary 
factor in boosting the production rate. The modification raised 
air rates significantly (Figure 3). Normal discharge pressures 
increased slightly, primarily due to additional friction loss at 
higher flow rates. 
Physical changes to the compressor were limited to elements 
in the flow path. Original impeller diameters of 36, 34 and 36 
in were enlarged to 38, 36 and 32 in diameters. Impeller eye 
diameters were increased at each stage to allow more flow. Six 
of the original impellers were adaptable to the new service. 
They were trimmed to a 32 in diameter. Two operating rotors 
and the common spare were modified. Twelve new impellers 
were ordered along with three sets of spacers, two sets of shaft 
seals and two sets of inlet guide vanes. 
The company supply policy had required the use of four 410 
stainless steel impeller forgings that had been stored in reserve 
at the manufacturer's warehouse. After the new forgings ar­
rived, the manufacturer checked the stored 410 SS forgings, 
only to find that they were only 37 in in diameter, and could 
not be used to make 38 in impellers. The stainless steel forgings 
stayed in the storehouse while two new 38 in 4430 forgings 
were ordered. Negotiations concerning the manufacturer's re­
sponsibility to pay for the mistake ended in a stalemate:' Two 
sets of diaphragms from each compressor were salvaged and 
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Figure 3. Air Compressor Performance Curves. 
modified for reuse in the new uprated design. A complete set 
of new diaphragms was ordered for the first train, to shorten 
the turnaround time for the revamp. The diaphragms from the 
first train were modified and installed in the second train. The 
second train diaphragms were modified, preserved, and put in 
storage as spares. 
All forgings were required to have at least four test coupons 
adequately identified for future use by the plant in weld repair 
procedures. Documentation of the new impellers included ma­
terial certification, heat treatment data, mechanical test results 
(which included yield strength, tensile strength, elongation and 
reduction of area data, and several Brinnell hardness readings), 
dimensional checks of critical dimensions both before and after 
the overspeed test, magnetic particle inspection after over­
speed, dye penetrant inspection after overspeed, and final in­
spections. 
A number of questions came up concerning discrepancies 
between the company's specification for material hardness and 
the manufacturer's specifications. These were resolved as being 
due to differences in the as quenched hardness for AISI 4330 
and 410 stainless steel tempered to identical mechanical 
strength levels. Both metals were quenched to produce 100 
percent martensitic structures and then tempered to meet the 
desired mechanical properties. The hardness of the martensite 
is a direct function of the carbon content. This explained the 
manufacturer's deviation (270 BHN) from the specification, 
which has a minimum yield strength of 80,000 psi and a Brinell 
hardness number (BHN) of 190 to 235 for the second stage 
impellers. The first stage impellers were all AISI 4340 with a 
specified minimum yield of 90,000 psi and a range of 235 to 
285 BHN, which matched the manufacturer's hardness criteria. 
However, in reviewing the documentation, values of 228 BHN, 
below the specified minimum value 235 BHN had been ap­
proved. The manufacturer's explanation was that the mechan-
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ical properties are the primary concern. Hardness tests are 
simply a process control device to assure against manufacturing 
or heat treating deviations. The company specialist agreed that 
the deviation from the minimum was not felt to be significant. 
All of the final rotor assembly was done at the manufacturer's 
repair shop. No modifications to the case, seal system, or bear­
ings were required. Completed parts were shipped to the plant 
where they were sorted and organized to reduce confusion and 
downtime during the plant shutdown. 
PROCESS GAS COMPRESSOR 
The process gas compressor was extensively revamped, both 
mechanically and aerodynamically. The compressor is a two 
section machine with an intercooler. The process gas is primar­
ily nitrogen with water vapor and various hydrocarbons. Solids 
tend to build up in low velocity areas on the impellers and in 
the compressor seals. Original design flow was several thousand 
pounds per minute with some liquid knockout at the interstage 
cooler. Rated speed was just under 5000 rpm. Inlet tempera­
tures were rated at 105°F due to the hot and humid Texas Gulf 
Coast summers. Discharge pressure approached 50 psig. Poly­
tropic efficiency was about 70 percent for section one and 77 
percent for section two. 
The compressor has a horizontally split casing, with five 
stages in two sections (Figure 4). The casing has three integral 
Figure 4. Process Compressor. 
feet, two fixed and one wobble foot to allow axial thermal 
growth. The suction and discharge flanges are 36 in and 30 in 
for section one and 30 in and 20 in for section two. The maximum 
flow capacity for the case was 60,000 acfm. The case itself is 
made of cast steel while the diaphragms are cast iron with 
stainless steel inserts at the impeller discharge volute. There 
were five stages, two in section one and three in section two. 
The first section, stage one, had an open 38 in cast impeller. 
The other four stages were enclosed welded impellers. All of 
the impellers were made of 410 stainless steel. The shaft has 
stainless steel sleeves and impeller spacers. It has a diameter 
of 8 7/8 in and a between-bearing span of 110 in. The bearings 
are all of the tilt pad type. Thrust bearing rated loading was 
264 psi with a maximum allowable of 500 psi. The compressor 
weighs in at over 50 tons, dangerously more than the manufac­
turer listed 36 tons. Initial buffer gas requirements to the shaft 
labyrinth seal system were stated at 4.2 lb/min at one psia for 
each outer seal and 10.1 lb/min at five psia for the discharge 
end seal. 
Performance changes were significant for the uprate (Figure 
5). Flow was increased significantly through the compressor 
while discharge pressure was reduced. The maximum continu­
ous operating speed was raised to 5300 rpm. 
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Figure 5. Process Compressor Performance Curves. 
Mechanically, the changes have been sweeping. The rede­
sign of the sealing system and addition of the balance piston 
are covered in a separate section. The aerodynamic section was 
extensively revamped. Bearings and the casing remained the 
same. Two relatively minor changes were made to the casing 
bore. The shafts were reused and several of the diaphragms 
were modified. 
The manufacturer's scope of supply included all new impel­
lers, sleeves, spacers, balance pistons, impeller eye and in­
terstage Fluorosint 500® seal strips, and inlet guide vanes, 
modifications of reuseable diaphragms, and new replacement 
diaphragms. A complete set of new diaphragms was ordered 
to shorten the first turnaround schedule. Each set of parts was 
listed and described in the scope of supply to eliminate any 
confusion. All of the radial and thrust bearings were reuseable. 
All spare parts of a new design were also included in this scope 
of supply. The company deemed it important to have spare 
parts on hand during startup. 
The new first stage impeller was 44 in in diameter and had 
open construction. The material was 410 stainless steel and was 
specified to have a maximum strength between 70,000 psi and 
90,000 psi and a 22 Rockwell C hardness factor. The second 
stage impeller was 38 in in diameter and had a closed construc­
tion. The specified material was 17-4 PH with a minimum yield 
strength of 100,000 psi. Maximum continuous speed was 5300 
rpm. This second stage impeller was the limiting factor in set­
ting the maximum continuous speed for the train. Hardness 
was to he 33 Rockwell C and a 255 to 311 Brinell hardness 
number. Rotating labyrinth teeth were manufactured on the 
impeller eyes. The third and fourth stage impellers were similar 
to each other in physical characteristics, with 40 inch diameters 
and closed construction. The material was 17-4 PH with a 
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minimum yield strength of 90,000 psi, a Rockwell C of 33, and 
a 255 to 311 Brinell hardness number. All 17-4 PH impellers 
were to meet NACE MR-Ol-75 specifications. A fourth "back­
up" forging was ordered for the second stage, due to expected 
difficulty in meeting the NACE specification and a 100,000 psi 
minimum yield strength. 
The manufacturer supplied impeller spacers and shaft sleeves 
were made of 410 stainless steel per company design drawings. 
The sleeves and spacers have rotating labyrinth teeth. The 
sleeves were to be Kanigen® coated for extra wear resistance. 
The new balance piston was also made of 410 stainless steel 
and was designed by the manufacturer. 
Meetings were held between plant engineers and the man­
ufacturer after the award of the purchase order, to assure agree­
ment on all points to the written scope of work, and to review 
design engineering. Particular attention was paid to the surge 
and stonewall characteristics of the compressors and the surge 
control system. The surge control system was sized and 
specified by the compressor manufacturer with design input 
from plant engineers. The schedule was also a primary concern 
of the discussion. Based on a promised delivery date of 2/24/86 
for all materials to the manufacture's Houston repair shop for 
assembly, a react or shutdown was scheduled 4/1/86 for modifi­
cation of the first train. All manufactured materials for all of 
the equipment were to be shipped by 3/10/86. This deadline 
was missed. Several parts for the April 1986 shutdown had to 
be pushed through on an emergency basis to meet the shutdown 
schedule. Parts for the second compressor were delayed several 
months, and barely arrived in time for the August 1986 shut­
down and revamp. Parts for the spare process compressor were 
not received until February 1987. At this writing, spare com­
pressor parts ordered in the original scope of supply still have 
not been received. Fortunately, the needed delivery of the 
items deviated significantly from the the company's original 
expectation. 
The manufacture of the components proved to be very dif­
ficult. Seal sleeves that were to be Kanigen ® coated were report­
edly done improperly several times by the manufacturer's sub­
vendor. Finally, they were acceptably coated by a local vendor 
in Houston. Major manufacturing problems developed with 
the impellers. The process gas inherently contains various quan­
tities of hydrogen cyanide, carbon dioxide, and water vapor. 
Alone, these chemicals cause no problem for 17-4 PH material. 
The presence of traces of chlorides or sulfides in the process 
gas, however, would cause stress corrosion cracking of the im­
pellers. The 17-4 PH material was chosen due to its higher 
strength which allowed for higher maximum continuous speed 
for the compressor. Since 17-4 PH impellers were a new experi­
ence for the company, a survey was taken of current users in 
process gas applications. No particular problems were uncov­
ered. The manufacturer stated that it would be difficult to meet 
the NACE specification and requested that the impellers be 
heat treated for a minimum yield strength of 105,000 psi and 
a hardness range of 277 to 352 Brinell. Their justification was 
that the NACE specification normally applied to gases contain­
ing hydrogen sulfide. Their request was not accepted due to 
the probability of sulfide contaminants at up to 10 ppm in the 
feedstocks. In addition, the corporate metallurgist felt that 
there was no good reason why a quality heat treatment shop 
could not meet both requirements and that if the material did 
not meet the specifications, it could be reheated. 
The first problem appeared with the chemical analysis of the 
17-4 forgings. Chromium content was only 14.73 percent which 
was below the 15 percent to 17.5 percent specified for the 17.4 
PH material. The chromium content was in the range of 15-5 
PH stainless steel. These forgings were accepted on the basis 
that mechanical properties, erosion resistance and weldability 
of both materials were equivalent and that replacement forgings 
would have lengthened the delivery schedule. 
This was just the start of material problems for the manufac­
turer. Four of the thirteen impellers that were ordered had to 
be scrapped. Although involvement of plant engineers was 
specifically requested in all major repairs, they were not aware 
of any of the problems with the impellers until after the schedule 
had unexpectedly slipped several weeks. Obtaining detailed 
information from the vendor regarding the problems that they 
were having was difficult. \Vitnessed inspection of the compo­
nents by plant personnel was not performed prior to shipment, 
due to the distance to the manufacturer's shop and the fact that 
the impellers were inspected and shipped several days, even 
weeks, apart. Quality assurance documentation often arrived 
well after the rotors had already been stacked at the manufac­
turer's repair shop. For instance, documentation for the second 
stage impeller did not arrive until a week before its scheduled 
installation in the first train. The impeller documentation 
showed that Brinell hardness readings were 321 BHN, above 
the stated maximum of 311 BHN. A Brinell hardness tester 
was brought into the plant. Twenty readings were taken on 
the disk and cover. Four of the readings on the disk ranged 
from 320 to 341 BHN. The manufacturer was notified that the 
company was rejecting that impeller. Unfortunately, one of the 
three impellers had already been declared scrap due to 0.008 
in oval discontinuity in the bore. The choices were to accept 
the impeller, attempt a repair of the oval bore, or wait several 
weeks until the third impeller was finished. The impeller was 
conditionally accepted, with assurances from the manufacturer 
that stress corrosion cracking would not occur. Close inspection 
of the impeller for any signs of stress corrosion cracking was 
scheduled for the next available opportunity. 
In addition, the first stage wheel, an open impeller made of 
410 stainless steel, was distorted beyond the possibility of sal­
vage during heat treatment. More problems affected the fourth 
stage wheels. Reportedly, one impeller came apart on the over­
speed test. A second impeller was found to have cracks along 
the blade weld seam after overspeed. The manufacturer's in­
spection revealed that the cracking was due to either slag or 
some other defect in the first pass weld. Structural design 
capability for the impeller was calculated to be 7000 rpm. The 
manufacturer cut out the cracked areas and rewelded them. 
They were then checked with magnetic particle and dye pen­
etrant inspection. Unfortunately, the impeller had already been 
finished machined. The reheat treatment caused a wavy distor­
tion in the impeller and it had to be scrapped. The third impeller 
was rushed through manufacturing to meet the schedule while 
two additional impeller forgings were ordered. With the new 
weld procedure, the problems were eliminated and subsequent 
impellers passed the overspeed test without any signs of cracking. 
Problems were also encountered in the retrofit of the reuse­
able diaphragms. New impeller outer diameters required 
machining of diaphragm surfaces and the installation of new 
wider diameter stainless steef inserts. In a few instances, the 
casting thickness was non-uniform and machining the, grooves 
for the inserts broke through the diaphragm wall. These holes 
were carefully evaluated. Since they did not effect either struc­
tural or aerodynamic integrity, they were not repaired. 
During stacking, one of the effluent compressor shafts was 
found to be bowed from a suspected liquid slug. Shaft bow was 
0.0015 in. A vertical stress relief procedure failed to significantly 
reduce the shaft bow. Other methods of straightening seemed 
more likely to increase the bow than straighten the shaft. The 
rotor was restacked without modifying the shaft. The air com­
pressor end of the shaft had been damaged. The coupling hub 
had spun on the shaft prior to the failure of the coupling dia­
phragm. The hub was galled to the shaft and had to be cut off. 
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The manufacturer's official recommendation was to scrap the 
shaft. The company, after consulting with the Houston repair 
shop, elected to chrome plate the affected area. After restacking 
the shaft and the sleeves, the chrome plated journals and hub 
areas were ground on an offset axis, to reduce the effect of the 
bow, while maintaining a fair degree of concentricity. The 
stacked rotor was then balanced and shipped. The manufacturer 
recalculated stresses on the hub for lower coefficient of friction 
between the chrome coated shaft and the hub. It was found to 
still be within an acceptable safety factor for the uprated con­
ditions. Typically, the diaphragm is designed to break first. 
Spinning of the hub on the shaft prior to diaphragm breakage 
was attributed to a possible mistake in the method of checking 
the hydraulic hub for proper location and fit. 0-rings should 
be left out for the first hub position and contact checks. 
When all of the materials were rtrceived onsite, the spare 
process compressor was rebuilt in the plant maintenance shop. 
A number of minor problems surfaced. The first concerned 
modification of the case. A four by one inch notch and a shoulder 
bevel had to be cut in the compressor bore. The manufacturer 
sent a field crew with a portable boring mill to do the job. The 
work took over two weeks of ten and twelve hour days to finish. 
It also appeared to be an unsafe working condition for the 
machinists. Upon inspection, the cut was of poor quality, and 
had to be ground out with a hand grinder in .order to properly 
fit the diaphragm. All subsequent case work was done by a 
local machine shop in their large horizontal boring mill. The 
local shop only took two days, had much better quality, and, 
in the final evaluation, cost less. 
Diaphragm fit problems surfaced with the second case, par­
ticularly in fitting the discharge wall. Amazingly, some of the 
bores and axial dimensions in the top half of the case did not 
match the bottom half casing. Some diaphragms and the dis­
charge wall had to be specially machined to fit properly. This 
was not a particularly difficult problem to solve, although it 
puts the cases' interchangeability with spare diaphragms in 
question. 
The field installation of the new compressors was relatively 
straightforward. The entire case was swapped out at once so 
that only piping boltup and shaft alignment needed to be done. 
There were also some minor piping additions that were done 
for the new buffer gas system. 
EXPANDER 
Original performance design of the expander was over 3000 
horsepower (hp) at 4854 rpm. Process gas normal conditions 
were rated at over 50 psia and 650°F inlet to an exhaust pressure 
of 15.5 psia. Flow at the rated pressures and horsepowers was 
near the design limitations. 
The original design was a four stage Rateau blading, integral 
rotor in a cast steel casing. The casing consisted of two different 
steam turbine exhaust end casings bolted together. One end 
was fixed while the other end had a "wobble foot" to allow for 
axial thermal expansion. The inlet and exhaust flanges were 20 
in and 30 in, respectively. The shaft was sealed by several sets 
of springloaded, labyrinth packing with a 4.5 lb/hr. nitrogen 
buffer gas injection. The first critical speed was 3200 rpm. The 
rotor was made of forged alloy steel with stainless steel buckets 
and shrouds. The rotor has a 64 in bearing span, and weighed 
1400 lbs. There were three interstage case drains between the 
diaphragms. The expander was. insulated \'lith foil backed, teflon 
faced, stainless steel mesh enclosed, custom-fitted blankets. 
The uprated design reduced inlet pressure to under 50 psia 
and increased potential inlet temperature an extra 100°F. This, 
coupled with the fact that the uprate significantly increased 
mass flow, required a significant increase in flow capacity. The 
higher mass flow ratio was primarily responsible for an increase 
in the horsepower rating to over 4000 hp at 5545 rpm. raising 
the inlet temperature from 650°F to 750°F while keeping the 
mass flow constant increases horsepower output by an estimated 
12 percent. Exhaust pressure increased about one to two per­
cent due to increased flow rates. 
Mechanically, only the rotors and diaphragms were changed 
(see Figure 6). The casing, bearings, and labyrinth seals re­
mained the same. Three new integral three stage rotors were 
manufactured, two for the process trains and one common 
spare. Two new sets of diaphragms were also manufactured. 
Although the rotor and diaphragms fit into the same relative 
envelope, the changes were quite significant. The blades for 
the new rotors had a cross section roughly eight times larger, 
were longer, and considerably stronger than the originals. Blade 
material is 403 stainless steel. There were less blades on the 
new rotor, approximately 60 per stage. The blades were riveted 
into a shroud, five or six to a packet. The number of stationary 
blades also decreased while the flow area increased several 
times. Only one casing modification had to be made. One inter­
nal circumferential shoulder had to be manually ground off at 
a 45 degree angle to accommodate the middle diaphragm (Fi­
gure 7). 
Figure 6. Expander Cross Section. 
Figure 7. Expander Diaphragm Cross Section. (Note that the 
second stage diaphragm bridges two diaphragm slots). 
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The expander shaft outboard end was extended four inches, 
to permit the future addition of a turning gear in the event 
that one would be required. The outboard bearing housing 
coverplate was modified to accommodate the longer shaft. 
A 20 in butterfly valve in the suction line was set to trip on 
an electronic overspeed or train trip signal. In the event of a 
coupling break, the valve would start to close as the rotor 
exceeded the emergency overspeed trip point setting of 5824 
rpm. The valve had a piston actuator using compression spring 
force to close and pneumatic pressure force to open. The trip 
signal opened a solenoid dump valve which bled off pneumatic 
pressure allowing the compression spring to close the butterfly 
valve. Air pressure opened the valve to 60 percent open, where 
a mechanical stop prevented further travel. The valve was set 
at 60 percent open, in order to ensure closure within the one 
second time period before the rotor reached destructive speed 
in the event of a breakaway. 
At 60 percent open, it created a major flow restriction with 
a Cv of 4200 and a pressure drop of eight psia. At 70 percent 
open, it had a Cv of 7000 and a pressure drop of only three 
psia; however, the valve closing time increased from 1.0 to 
1.16 seconds. The rise in speed in the event of a breakaway is 
estimated at 3000 revolutions per second by the manufacturer. 
Opening the valve fully would increase the closure time and 
result in the catastrophic failure of the rotor. To decrease the 
valve closure time, two additional solenoid dump valves were 
installed on the pneumatic side of the actuator piston. Closure 
time was reduced to under one second from the full open 
position. The pressure drop to the expander inlet was 
minimized, increasing net horsepower output. 
The mechanical design was thoroughly evaluated prior to 
the start of manufacturing. Rotordynamic diagrams and 
mechanical design were reviewed by plant maintenance en­
gineers and an outside structural/vibration consultant. 
Campbell diagrams, Goodman-Soderberg diagrams, SAFE in­
terference diagrams, ANSYS generated mode shape and fre­
quency diagrams and calculations, a lateral vibration analysis, 
and a torsional analysis were all part of the review. The review 
brought out a number of legitimate user concerns and resulted 
in some changes in the design. Due to a previous blade failure, 
blading design was subjected to intense scrutiny. The proposed 
blades were rejected on the basis that the trailing edge of the 
airfoil extended off the platform, creating a potential failure 
point. The manufacturer agreed to supply a new blade design 
with the airfoil totally over the platform. 
Concerns were also expressed about interferences shown on 
the Campbell diagrams for each stage. The first stage had a 
second tangential resonance within our operating range. Low­
ering minimum governor speed to 3600 rpm created an inter­
ference at the last stage rocking mode. The manufacturer stated 
that, although the interferences were present in the operating 
range, the mode shapes were not conducive to the development 
of enough energy at resonance to cause any problem. 
The new critical speeds were at 3000 rpm for the first and 
at 6900 rpm for the second critical. The coupling still had above 
a 2.0 service factor. The thrust bearing service factor had a 
new load of 192 psi, and was rated for a 412 psi maximum 
loading. New thrust bearing temperatures were well below the 
200°F limit set by the manufacturer. 
Goodman-Soderberg diagrams were also reviewed with close 
attention to the philosophy of the determination of amplification 
and safety factors. The manufacturer stated that they were very 
conservative in their design. Their minimum allowable safety 
factor was one and a half. The overall stress levels were limited 
to no more than two thirds of the variable yield strength, even 
at amplification factors of twelve. The evaluation revealed no 
problems. Across the operating range, the first stage wheel has 
a safety factor between two and one half and three for amplifi­
cation factors of seven to nine. The second stage had a lower 
safety factor-two to two and one half, due to identical amplifi­
cation factors and higher horsepower. The third stage had a 
safety factor just under two. This was caused by an amplification 
factor of ten to twelve, due to a harmonic at five times running 
speed. A second analysis was done to determine the effects of 
raising the inlet temperature an additional l00°F. For the ex­
pected stresses, the rise in temperature significantly lowered 
the safety factor. The first stage safety factors were reduced 
from 2.45 to 1.88 for the blades and 2.48 to 1.91 for the root. 
Stage two safety factors were reduced from 2.08 to 1.93.for the 
blades and 2.18 to 2.02 for the root. The third stage was below 
550°F and safety factors were not significantly affected by the 
increase in temperature. 
Detailed ANSYS generated mode shapes for blades and blade 
packets. Each packet consisted of five blades riveted into a 
shroud. Vibration response was calculated using ANSYS finite 
element modelling. Each packet was modelled and the har­
monics checked. Blades were also modelled. Deflections of the 
blades were fairly large due to resonance and a high excitation 
force generated by the axial velocity of the gas. 
Axial deflection of the diaphragms was also scrutinized very 
closely. Calculations were done for a 31 psi drop across the 
expander. The first stage had an axial deflection of 0.037 in 
with the expected pressure differential of 12 psi across the 
diaphragm. The second stage had 0.025 in deflection for a 9.5 
psi differential. The third stage, with a much thinner dia­
phragm, had 0.072 in deflection for a 9.3 psi differential. The 
deflection is calculated at the edge of the diaphragm (shaft seal). 
Although the diaphragm had 0.250 in clearance at the center 
edge, it was only 0.050 in at the root of the stationary blade. 
Deflection along the length of the diaphragm cross section was 
checked and found to be 0.045 in at the blade root, leaving 
only 0.005 in clearance. The manufacturer modified the design 
to provide the nominal, as installed, no flow clearance of 0.100 
in. This left a safe 0.055 in clearance at the maximum flow, 
maximum deflection condition and reduced the possibility of 
a rub. 
Performance details were also examined. The manufacturer 
expected a significant velocity loss at the inlet flange face. Pre­
sently the expander recovers about 60 BTU per pound of flow. 
Using energy (BTU/lb mass) lost = (Vel/223.7) x 3; a loss of 
4.0 BTU/pound was present at maximum flow conditions. This 
loss did not warrant redesign of the case. 
The following quality assurance measures were specified to 
provide maximum confidence in the rotor and diaphragm con­
struction. Material certification, magnetic particle test, ul­
trasonic test, complete dimensional check including coupling 
hub contact, concentricity check, probe area electrical and 
mechanical runout check, residual magnetism, and a twelve­
point residual balance test, per API Standards, were part of 
the testing and documentation of the rotor. The manufacturer 
did not have overspeed test capabilities, so an overspeed test 
was not performed. All of the documentation for the material 
certifications, magnetic particle test, and the ultrasonic test 
was reviewed by the corporate metallurgist. Everything else 
was witness checked and tested in a final inspection before 
release for shipment. Only three minor problems were disco­
vered. The turning gear rotor extension had high residual mag­
netism, and the circumferential gap between shroud bands was 
non uniform and smaller than manufacturer's specification al­
lowed. The extension was quickly degaused. The gap specifica­
tion was a manufacturing tolerance only. The gap was within 
operating tolerance limits. Contact checks of the shaft's coupling 
hub taper initially showed poor results on all three rotors. All 
three rotors had "slight raised lip and small burrs" along the 
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0-ring shoulders that prevented the ring gauge from sliding 
onto the shaft properly. Light sanding with emery cloth cor­
rected the problem. Ring gauge contact was good. 
One major problem was encountered during manufacturing. 
In grinding the taper on the shaft for the coupling hub, the 
manufacturer mistakenly used a lesser taper than the specified 
112 in!ft taper. Correcting the shaft to the correct taper effec­
tively lengthened the coupling gap by about 0.200 in. After 
reviewing current coupling gap and shim location data taken 
during the last shutdown, along with the engineers' ability to 
attain a small degree of adjustment in setting the new diap­
hragms, it was decided that the error could be accommodated. 
In order to assure interchangeability, all three rotors were 
ground to the same dimensions. New coupling nuts were de­
signed to make up for the fact that the hub was an additional 
0.200 in up the shaH:. 
Field work was done under the close supervision of the man­
ufacturer's service engineer and a service representative. The 
service engineer was primarily responsible for determining the 
final positioning cuts to be made in the diaphragms after a trial 
fit with the new three-stage rotor. He also supervised the 
machining at a local shop. Each expander case was stripped 
and cleaned. All new bearings and seals were installed in addi­
tion to the uprate design diaphragms and rotors. The job went 
smoothly and without any significant problems. Diaphragm 
hold down and alignment screw taps drilled and tapped by the 
manufacturer did not match those in the case. They had to be 
redrilled and tapped in the field in a different position. The 
manufacturer should have left the drilling and tapping for the 
plant machinists. 
ANTISURGE SYSTEM 
As part of the engineering design package, the compressor 
vendor was required to perform an analysis of the existing 
antisurge system and recommend modifications required for 
the compressor's new performance parameters. The operating 
system is inherently resistant to operating conditions that could 
induce surge. It is a once through process with few potential 
restrictions. The antisurge system was required to respond to 
these potential restrictions. 
The highest potential for surge is during startup, when the 
air compressor discharge must be blowing off to atmosphere 
and the process compressor must be recirculating. There is a 
potential to generate heat from zero flow windage in the expan­
der. During this time, there is also a potential for the process 
compressor to pull excessive vacuum on the intermediate com­
ponents. Besides surge, another major concern was having 
enough horsepower, since the expander contributes no horse­
power during startup. The revamp increased each compressor's 
capacity while lowering discharge head. Since the steam turbine 
rated output was very close to the horsepower required, the 
system was analyzed very carefully to assure startup ability. 
The original surge control system had a blowoff valve to 
atmosphere on the air compressor discharge. This existed exc­
lusively for startup purposes. The process compressor had a 
recirculation line from the second section discharge back to 
the first section suction that controlled flow through the entire 
machine. The recirculation control valve was controlled by an 
analog surge control device that sensed case differential pres­
sure vs inlet flow corrected for inlet pressure and temperature. 
There was also a second recirculation line from the first section 
discharge to first section suction that was controlled by a speed 
switch. Below a certain speed, it was possible that the large 
flow capacity of the first section could stonewall or choke the 
second section. Opening of the valve reduced flow into the 
second section. Suction line coolers removed the heat of com­
pression during recirculation. The new compressive heat load 
was calculated, based on anticipated worst case startup condi­
tions, and was determined to be well within the capability of 
the coolers. Finally, there was a vacuum breaker valve that 
allowed makeup mass flow into the process compressor to re­
duce the potential for drawing excessive vacuum. 
Currently, surge control is manipulated by the plant's integ­
rated control system. The existing control loop was modified 
to control only the first section of the compressor using a ten 
percent margin from the surge line (Figure 1). A second analog 
control loop was added to control the second section using a 
15 percent margin. The two sections were given different mar­
gins, because the second section will surge first as volume flow 
is restricted. The surge control valves do not open during nor­
mal operation. Operating points are typically much closer to 
maximum flow conditions than the surge line. 
Dual ball type control valves were used in the recirculation 
loops in lieu of one large control valve. Concerns over noise 
and reliability were the deciding factors requiring dual valves. 
The second significant change was the addition of a suction 
"damper" on the inlet to the first section of the process compres­
sor. This inlet damper is a large butterfly type valve. The 
damper reduces mass flow to the process compressor, thereby 
reducing horsepower during the startup phase. The damper 
also decreases the possibility of pulling excessive vacuum on 
upstream components and eliminated the need to enlarge the 
existing vacuum breaker. The inlet damper has a mechanical 
stop to prevent its total closure. 
PROCESS  COMPRESSOR SEAL SYSTEM 
The original shaft seal design incorporated two different buf­
fer gas injections into labyrinth seals. Inert purge gas, which 
is nitrogen with minimal organic vapor, is used on the inner 
shaft seals while pure nitrogen is used on the outer shaft seals. 
The suction end used a low pressure inert purge gas injected 
between process and a vent port to the process flare. Flow was 
controlled by maintaining a five psi differential pressure over 
suction pressure. The flare port was similarly sealed from atmos­
phere using a nitrogen injection. A 1.5 psi differential pressure 
was maintained between the nitrogen injection port and the 
flare port. 
The discharge end shaft seal was similar except it used high 
pressure inert purge gas as a buffer between the process, at 
second stage discharge pressure, and the flare port. It had a 
shorter labyrinth seal between the injection port and process, 
due to space constraints. The labyrinths had stationary teeth 
riding over a smooth stainless steel shaft sleeve. The labyrinth 
seals between the vent port and the process gas are made of 
Fluorosint 500®. This material was favored to be in contact 
with the process gas, due to its chemical resistance properties. 
The seal cartridges were also made from this material. The 
outermost labyrinth seals, containing the nitrogen injection 
ports, were made from aluminum. 
A number of problems were experienced with this seal sys­
tem: erosion of the Fluorosint 500® labyrinth teeth; high nitro­
gen costs; higher than expected buffer gas flows; and, high 
maintenance replacement cost. In one case, loss of a seal re­
sulted in the contamination of the lube oil system with solids 
from the process gas. Another problem was the buildup of 
solids between the stationary labyrinth teeth. Solids would 
harden and actually cut into the stainless steel shaft sleeve. 
To improve the shaft sealing system, the plant engineers set 
out with the following objectives: reduce nitrogen consumption; 
improve mechanical reliability; and, reduce the maintenance 
replacement costs. 
These objectives were met by a number of progressive and 
simultaneous steps (Figure 8). First, 410 SS seal cartridges 
were designed and fabricated by an after market supplier, with 
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the inner bore lined with smooth, replaceable Fluorosint 500® 
inserts. Second, rotating labyrinth teeth were added to the 
shaft sleeve design. The rotating steel labyrinth teeth were 
more durable than the stationary Fluorosint 500® teeth. This 
design is less susceptible to erosion damage and accumulation 
of solids buildup. Third, all diametral clearances were reduced 
to the minimum required for assembly purposes. Since the 
Fluorosint 500® is an abradable material, diametral clearances 
were reduced from 0. 012 in to 0.004 in. The clearance under 
the aluminum labyrinth was also reduced from 0.016 in to 0.008 
in (and was later opened back to 0.015 in. These new clearances 
were discussed with the manufacturer prior to manufacture 
and installation. Rubbing of the rotating teeth against the 
Fluorosint 500® inserts was evident on initial startup during 
slow roll, but quickly dissipated as the inserts abraded. 
Fourth, a balance piston was added to reduce the sealing 
pressure on the discharge end (Figures 9 and 10). The balance 
piston has two sets of rotating teeth sealing against two Fluoro­
sint 500® strips. A buffer gas flow of about 25 acfm is injected 
between the stationary abradable strips through about twenty 
equally spaced 5/16 in diameter holes. The radial clearance is 
a nominal 0.004 in. 
Figure 8 .  Process Compressor Discharge End Seal System Mod­
ification . 
High pressure buffer gas injection was installed on the bal­
ance piston to reduce the chances of fouling in the labyrinth 
area. The low pressure side of the balance piston vents to the 
first section discharge line. The inner labyrinth shaft has a low 
pressure inert purge injection replacing high pressure injection. 
By reducing the sealing pressure, it was reasoned that the 
pressure at each injection port would be reduced, thereby 
reducing the required nitrogen injection pressure and, hence, 
nitrogen flow. 
Fifth, the number and diameter of the injection holes in the 
outer aluminum labyrinth shaft seals were increased. This im­
proved the reliability of the seal by ensuring the injection pres­
sure measured outside of the compressor would more closely 
match the actual sealing pressure at the labyrinth seal. A new 
outer seal is currently being designed to further reduce clear­
ances, hence nitrogen injection costs, to an absolute minimum. 
INITIAL STARTUP OF THE FIRST TRAIN 
Getting the train up to minimum governor control speed for 
the first time after the revamp was fairly difficult. The compres-
Figure 9. Balance Piston Diagramatic Cross Section. 
Figure 10.  Balance Piston with Fluorosint® Seals. 
sors were all running with new temperature and pressure con­
ditions. A panel monitor and a portable FFT analyzer were 
used to monitor vibration. Bearing temperatures and process 
conditions were monitored on the plant computer. 
The compressor train was brought up to a slow roll of 500 
rpm. Air was being circulated throughout the system and the 
process had not started. The air compressor exhibited some 
brief vibration due to seals wearing in, as evidenced by vibration 
dropping gradually from 3.0 mils to 0.6 mils. After an hour of 
smooth running, the speed was increased to 1500 rpm. The 
process compressor ramped up to 5.0 mils vibration fairly 
rapidly, tripping the train. Restart attempts tripped in the same 
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manner. The bearings and the outboard aluminum seals were 
pulled. A rub was apparent on the aluminum labyrinth teeth . 
The seal clearance was checked with a feeler gauge and found 
to have an 0 .008 in clearance, half of the manufacturer's recom­
mended 0 .016 in clearance. These clearances were purposefully 
tightened. The aluminum labyrinth seal clearances were 
opened up to 0 .015 in and the compressor was reassembled. 
The compressor train was restarted and vibration levels were 
quite low, 0 .4  mils. 
While still slow rolling, expander vibration began to increase . 
The increase was almost logarithmic with time, slowly increas­
ing from 0 .21 mils to over 5 .0  mils in a few seconds to trip the 
train. Several attempts at startup were made, all with the same 
ramping vibration pattern . The FFT analyzer showed virtually 
all of the energy was concentrated in a long thin pulse at running 
speed (Figure 1 1) .  The speed of the compressor was changed, 
but the amplitude of vibration appeared independent of rotating 
speed. Audible noise and noise heard through an ultrasonic 
listening device indicated a hard rub. Inlet and outlet piping 
supports, spring hangers, and slide plates were checked for 
freedom of motion and found to be free . As a final measure, 
50 lb cooling steam was jnjected into the inlet. This lowered 
the inlet temperature gradually to 500°F from 670°F .  As the 
temperature of the inlet gas dropped, so did the vibration. 
With the expander running smoothly at 0 .6  mils, speed was 
brought up to minimum governor, 4000 rpm. Inlet temperature 
was then slowly raised by about twenty degrees an hour until 
750°F, the maximum allowable inlet temperature, was reached. 
Vibration stayed at below 0 .6 mils throughout the temperature 
changes, finally settling out at 0 .3  mils. Subsequent startups 
revealed that the expander vibration was sensitive to the rate 
of temperature increase . A teardown inspection of the internals 
in August revealed very hard shaft rubs along the bottom inlet 
end seals. A new operating procedure was drafted to bring 
inlet temperature up slowly . 
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Figure 11. Expander Vibration Spectrum. 
The steam turbine also showed a relatively high vibration 
level of 1 .5 mils at slow roll. Spectrum analysis from both 
probes revealed a sharp amplitude at synchronous speed. The 
time wave form indicated a sharp jump. The cause was deter­
mined to be a scratch in the shaft. Vibration rose to 1 .9 mils 
at operating speed. Alarm and shutdown levels in the monitor 
were adjusted slightly to protect against an accidental trip. 
PERFORMANCE TEST 
A performance test was necessary after the first week of 
operation . Overall performance of the train was measured by 
plant management in terms of air flow delivered to the process. 
The air rate of the up rated train was poor, at or below that of 
the original compressor train. Naturally, top management was 
upset . A performance test was set up with the help of a service 
engineer from the compressor manucturer. 
All of the required instrument taps were already in place. 
Although the setup does not meet ASME PTC-10 require­
ments, a high degree of accuracy was expected. Inlet and outlet 
temperature and pressure gauge connections existed on all of 
the machines . Rotational speed was measured by two digital 
tachometers . Flow measurement was taken across orifice plates 
for the steam turbine and expander and with flow tubes on the 
air compressor and effiuent compressor discharges . A manome­
ter was hooked to the upstream and downstream taps on the 
venturi flow tube. One minor problem was that static pressure 
readings were taken downstream of the venturi rather than at 
the 1/4 in static pressure tap in the flow tube. This was calculated 
to create less than one percent effective error for flow. The 
flow tube itself is accurate within 0 .5  percent. Readings were 
adjusted for deviations in relative humidity, barometric pres­
sure, ambient temperature, and specific gravity of the process 
gas relative to specified conditions. Readings were taken with 
one calibrated, hand-held thermocouple, one hand-held 
pneumatic indicator, and one water manometer . By using the 
same instruments, the possibility of error between two separate 
instruments was eliminated. Process conditions were held 
stable by operations. A chemical analysis was done on process 
streams on both sections of the process compressor and the 
expander to determine molecular weight and specific gravity 
of the gases . 
Six tests were performed overall at different speeds and 
operating conditions over three days . Three tests were done 
at maximum output . The others were done at low speeds, one 
of which throttled the inlet flow to the expander . Finally, one 
was done at high speed with the air compressor inlet valve 
throttled. Four people took data . Three were in the field . One 
monitored the train performance in the control room to assure 
consistency of the data. 
For actual comparison purposes, the full power test runs 
were compared to the specified 125 percent case from the 
operating conditions on API data sheets filled in by the manufac­
turer . Major deviations from these parameters were listed and 
horsepower gains and losses were tallied . Major performance 
problems were uncovered in each machine, with the exception 
of the steam turbine which had not been modified. The air 
compressor was showing a low efficiency at about 74 . 4  percent, 
well below the quoted 80 percent. This low efficiency was 
costing a few hundred horsepower. Inlet temperatures into 
each stage of the effiuent compressor were 1 14°F and ll8°F, 
several degrees over the maximum rated inlet temperatures of 
105°F. This cost over 100 BHP for each section. In the effiuent 
compressor section, one efficiency was much higher than ex­
pected-86.3  percent vs a predicted 74 percent . This was a 
net savings of a few hundred horsepower based on calculations . 
The efficiency increase was theorized to be the result of a liquid 
fog carryover out of the suction separators. As the liquid aerosol 
passed through the compressor it vaporized, creating a continu­
ous intercooling effect . This phenomena is covered in depth 
in a later section . 
The expander was not performing as expected, even with 
higher than normal inlet temperature boosting horsepower by 
about 250 HP. The expander performance data could not be 
directly compared with manufacturer supplied performance 
curves . :"�few performance curves were extrapolated from the 
manufacturer's curves to represent speeds and temperatures 
at the operating points. These curves showed that pressure 
drop across the expander was lower than expected for the mea-
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sured flows. The horsepower balance for the train also showed 
that less horsepower was being generated by the expander than 
expected for the actual flow rates. Calculations indicated that 
12 percent less horsepower was being generated. 
Based on the findings of the performance tests, an action 
plan was developed and implemented for correction of the 
known problems. Test data was sent to the various manufac­
turer's engineers for their own evaluation. Meetings were then 
set up with the manufacturers, to review results of their evalu­
ation and to determine further testing needs and the anticipated 
scope of repair. The air compressor and process compressor 
were made by the same manufacturer. The performance en­
gineer assigned to the project stated that, typically, the air 
compressor design produces slightly higher head and efficiency 
than predicted. The data, however, showed the efficiency to 
be five percent lower and the pressure coefficient to be 2.5 
percent lower than expected. This suggested an internal prob­
lem -possibly an excessive amount of recirculation or incorrect 
hardware positioning. A list of potential errors was generated: 
• Discharge scrolls reversed with respect to rotation. 
• Diaphragms reversed with respect to rotation. 
• Impeller and shaft labyrinths are out of clearance tolerance 
or badly damaged. 
• The third stage inlet guides, which are angled to provide 
pre-swirl counter to rotation, are reversed. 
• Excess buffer gas seal leakage. 
• Inlet wall and diaphragm split line gaps. 
Due to the relatively smooth operation of the compressor 
since its uprate and the large volume of recycle required, seal 
leakage and split line gaps were ruled out . Reversal of internal 
parts was perceived as the most likely cause of the performance 
shortfall. Plans were made to open and inspect the first train 
during a total plant shutdown scheduled for August 1986. 
The process gas compressor performance was also in question 
due to the actual data's relation to the expected performance 
on the pressure coefficient and efficiency curves {Figures 12 
and 13) . The most obvious problem was that inlet temperature 
was much higher than expected, boosting the actual cubic feet 
per minute ACFM significantly along with the corresponding 
horsepower required. Chemical cleaning of the suction coolers 
at the first opportunity solved that problem. The performance 
engineer also stated that the open impeller appeared to have 
a ten percent larger capacity than expected. This tended to lift 
actual data above the pressure coefficient curve. In addition, 
the higher calculated efficiency was due to liquid entrainment. 
Liquid entrainment has a positive effect in that evaporation of 
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liquid particles in the stream acts like an intercooler increasing 
calculated efficiency. However, film evaporation of liquid on 
the thermowell can distort discharge temperature readings to 
well below thermodynamically expected values. The perfor­
mance engineer stated that although there was a net increase 
in performance, as supported by the net horsepower balance, 
the real efficiency and pressure increases were much lower 
than the calculations indicated. He also stated that he had no 
way of quantifying actual compressor performance for our two 
phase flow. The final conclusion was that the compressor was 
performing better than expected. Exactly how much better is 
not known. A strain gauge torque meter would give the best 
definition of actual horsepower, but was viewed an unjustifiable 
cost . 
Expander performance was well off the predicted perfor­
mance curves. Inlet pressure versus flow diagrams revealed 
that the ·expander was not generating the specified resistance 
per pound of gas flow. Initially, the manufacturer maintained 
that the plant's flow readings were in error. Flow instruments 
were double checked for both calibration and calculation of the 
flow. The expander inlet flow meters involved were orifice 
plates with pipe flange pressure taps. Measured flow readings 
were confirmed by gas analysis and stoiciometric calculations. 
The manufacturer's lead engineer made a site inspection, but 
still maintained the problem was in the plant's flow measure­
ment. The manufacturer's calculations were supported by an 
independent consultant . Nevertheless, the company requested 
a reduction in nozzle area to increase inlet pressure. Nozzle 
area was reduced on the plant's second set of diaphragms (which 
had not yet been installed) at the manufacturer's factory and 
double checked in the field . Trailing edges were cut at both 
ends, bent, and re-welded to reduce the cross sectional flow 
area. The area reduction was based on field data points and 
expected pressure drop between stages. Pluggage of the case 
drains prevented the acquisition of accurate interstage pressure 
data. All three stages were modified proportionally. 
In conjunction with the fixes scheduled for the first train and 
the modifications to the second train, the steam turbines were 
evaluated for potential stepwise horsepower increases. Removal 
of the second stage would allow an additional 25 percent more 
steam flow, and this would significantly increase output. The 
spare turbine rotor was modified for the second shutdown. 
PLANT SHUTDOWN 
A total plant shutdown took place in August 1986. Revamp 
of the entire second train as well as modifications to the first 
train were the critical path items. Completion of the turnaround 
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on the first train was to be done as quickly as possible. Eight 
days were allowed for turnaround of the first train, while thir­
teen days were allowed for the second train. The critical path 
item for the first train was the removal and modification of the 
expander diaphragms. After the cases were opened and mea­
surements were taken, the first train diaphragms were removed 
and shipped to the manufacturer's closest qualified repair shop 
for modification of the cross sectional flow area. The manufac­
turer's service engineer accompanied the diaphragms to ensure 
quality workmanship and the quickest possible turnaround. 
The manufacturer's facility would have been preferred, but it 
was in the midst of a labor strike. Turnaround on the diaphragms 
lasted about six days from shipment to return. In the meantime, 
the second set of diaphragms, already modified, was machined 
to fit the first train case. Measurements taken on both cases 
confirmed that this exchange would not cause a sloppy dia­
phragm fit in either case. 
The first train air compressor was opened and the locations 
of all internals were checked. Two inlet guide vane halves to 
the third section were interchanged. The vane orientation had 
choked the inlet eye area and had distorted the flow preswirl 
into both third stage impeller eyes. 
The first train steam turbine rotor was replaced with the 
spare rotor. The second stage diaphragms were removed and 
stored for possible future use. Inspection of the turbine inter­
nals revealed hard seal rubs on one area of the the shaft labyrinth 
seals. A sweep of the internals with a mandrel revealed misalign­
ment of the case, bearings, and diaphragms. Due to pressure 
to startup and a relatively trouble-free history, the spare rotor 
was installed and the unit reassembled without realignment of 
the internals. A hydraulic bolting service with ultrasonic tension 
checking equipment was used to bolt up the turbine. Two 
teams of two men each simultaneously bolted up each side of 
the turbine within ten hours. 
The second train was also successfully revamped within the 
allotted time of thirteen days. Work went fairly smoothly with 
few problems. The second train process compressor was re­
placed with the company's spare process compressor, previ­
ously rebuilt in the plant's maintenance shop. The air compres­
sor was disassembled. New diaphragms and a revamped rotor 
were installed without any problems. The second steam turbine 
revamp, however, provided some interesting challenges. A 
mandrell sweep and the condition of the labyrinth packing 
indicated that the alignment of the case, diaphragms, and bear­
ings was poor. All diaphragms were cleaned, reinstalled and 
aligned. The case bore and bearing housings were also brought 
into alignment. The biggest problem arose in the disassembly 
of the multivalves from both steam turbines. The threaded 
ends of the stems of four out of ten valves were badly damaged 
during disassembly. Fortunately, the manufacturer was able 
to quickly respond to the company's need. The valves were 
manufactured and nitride treated on an emergency basis. The 
unit was started up on schedule with the new valves. 
The manpower requirements for this job should be men­
tioned. The plant utilizes a non-union maintenance contractor. 
Standard millwright manning levels for the entire plant are 
only three journey men, three apprentices, and one foreman. 
For the August shutdown, besides work on the two compressor 
trains, there was a turbine generator uprate from 13.8 to 17.0 
MW and numerous miscellaneous rotating equipment jobs that 
could only be performed during a total plant shutdown. Work 
was scheduled for two ten hour shifts, seven in the morning 
until five at night, and six at night till four in the morning. An 
hour overlap between shifts was necessary for turnover and 
coordination between the foremen, supervisor, and manufac­
turer's representatives. Overall, as much work was completed 
in a twenty hour day as in a twenty four hour day. 
Approximately sixty "traveling" millwrights were brought in 
by the maintenance contractor. In addition, an outside tur­
bomachinery maintenance contractor provided twelve skilled 
mechanics. The outside contractor worked on the first train 
modifications only. As could be expected, there was some fric­
tion between the regular and the outside maintenance contrac­
tor, particularly over the use of common equipment, such as 
mandrils, air hammers, etc. Five service representatives from 
the manufacturers were brought in for varying lengths of time 
to oversee the quality of the work performed. Our regular 
millwrights temporarily became foremen to direct and facilitate 
the work of the "traveling" millwrights. A plant engineer coor­
dinated and directed the millwright work and service represen­
tative support. Due to our lean supervision, a critical aspect 
to the success of the revamp was the ability and willingness of 
some of the service representatives to direct some of the work, 
rather than simply inspecting as things came apart and went 
back together. 
In terms of the workforce, the "traveling" millwright force 
had a random distribution of skill level and work ethic. Disas­
sembly of the second train equipment gave some opportunity 
to evaluate and separate the workers. Those who were moti­
vated or skilled continued work on the compressors while the 
others were assigned to simple tasks or terminated. On the 
average, productivity of the traveling work force was fair to 
low. A second disadvantage of the travelers was theft. The 
agreement with the maintenance contractor specifies that the 
company would supply all tools. Virtually all of the supplied 
tools under 16 in long were stolen. Having had a similar bad 
experience during the April shutdown, several extra sets of 
small tools were stocked in the storehouse and made available 
as the field supply disappeared. Although the tool cost was a 
few times higher than it should have been, work did not stop 
due to a shortage of five inch wrenches or dial indicators. In 
comparison, the outside contractor, who was motivated by a 
chance to get in the plant, provided skilled and motivated 
mechanics who worked efficiently and brought their own tools. 
In an overall evaluation, the "travelers," in general, were not 
as skilled, as trustworthy, or as cost effective as the outside 
turbo machinery contractor. Politically, although the presence 
of the outside contractor caused some minor attitude problems, 
it has also provided some negotiating leverage with our regular 
maintenance contractor. The outside contractor will continue 
to be utilized as a supplement to our contract work force. 
CURRENT PERFORMANCE 
Performance has been tested several times since the August 
shutdown. Historically, the first train steam turbine has had a 
lower maximum steam flow than the second train by about 
10,000 pounds per hour steam. In addition, due to the steam 
system configuration, the first train has inlet steam that is 10° 
to 20°F cooler than the second train. After the uprate modifi­
cation these differences remain, even though the calculated 
efficiency of both turbines is identical. Detailed measurement 
of internals and inspection for damage or pluggage may provide 
some. clue as to why there is a difference in maximum flow. 
The air compressors are now operating with similar efficiency 
although, due to lower horsepower input, the air flow rate is 
lower in the first train. 
The process compressor is experiencing considerably more 
liquid carryover due to much higher flow rates. An analytical 
method of determining mixed flow performance is being re­
searched in preference to installing strain gauges on the coupl­
ing. The case will be opened during the next major shutdown 
to determine the extent of any erosion damage due to the 
additional liquid flow, and to check the second stage impeller 
for stress corrosion cracking. 
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Finally, the expander on the first train produces less power 
than the second train expander for a number of reasons. The 
main factor is lower mass flow. The process gas is essentially 
inert nitrogen from the air compressor. Due to lower steam 
turbine output, there is a lower flow rate, hence a lower pres­
sure ratio across the expander, reducing efficiency and horse­
power. The first train expander has a higher inlet temperature 
than the second train. This actually adds horsepower to the 
first expander, but not enough to significantly offset the effects 
of lower flow. 
LIQUID CARRYOVER 
This phenomena and its effect on both sections of the process 
compressor are not well understood at this time. The makeup 
of the two phase flow is not defined, as yet, in terms of chemical 
composition and mole percent of the liquid versus the gas 
phases. Size , or even weight percent of liquid in each stream, 
is not known. What is known is that the efficiency of the inlet 
separators drops radically as flow increases (Figure 14) and that 
liquid exists in both compressor discharge lines. 
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Figure 14. Typical Separation Efficiency vs Superficial Velocity 
through Vane Type Separation . 
For the given rotating speed, a higher pressure ratio and 
flow rate than predicted exists. Currently, the measured flow 
rate, in acfm, through the process compressor at 4900 rpm, 
should not be achievable, according to the manufacturer's data, 
until the speed exceeds 5200 rpm. Both flow and pressure ratio 
at 4900 rpm exceed expected values quoted for 5200 rpm, 
although calculated horsepower is similar. The expected final 
production rate is constrained by a maximum continuous speed 
of 5300 rpm, due to the speed limitations of the process com­
pressor second stage wheel. This flow enhancement effect 
points to the possibility of significantly greater production rates 
than originally envisioned in the uprate. Naturally , the side 
effects of higher flow will have to be investigated; however, 
the prospects for higher rates look good. 
An ongoing literature search has produced few good refer­
ences on wet compression in centrifugal compressors thus far. 
They report that wet compression typically increases the pres-
sure ratio and hence flow for a given speed. Horsepower per 
pound of total flow was also shown as decreasing with liquid 
addition. Tests were done on air compressors using water for 
liquid injection. A water to air weight ratio of about four percent 
was reported as optimum. Excess water tends to reduce effi­
ciency, negating the positive effects of the higher pressure 
ratio. Disadvantages of water injection were also considered. 
Erosion damage and entrained solids deposition from the liquid 
injection are obvious effects. A second deleterious effect is 
movement of the surge line to the right. This is not a problem 
in this case, with the current high flow, low resistance opera­
tion. The authors also warn of possible mismatching of compo­
nents in compressors that are not specifically designed for con­
tinuous liquid injection. 
Currently, the plans are to gather more literature on the 
various aspects of wet compression. Since the liquid carryover 
and its effects have caught the company by surprise, the existing 
instrumentation is inadequate to provide adequate data on two 
phase flow. New sampling probes and shielded thermocouples 
are being investigated for installation during the next available 
shutdown. A practical methodology for the calculation of the 
actual performance still needs to be identified and fully de­
veloped. The mixture of different components making up the 
liquid carryover complicates the calculation. Current carryover 
is grossly estimated to be over ten percent of the dry gas weight 
flow, well in excess of the four percent recommended for op­
timum results. New, low pressure drop, suction separators 
have been ordered to eliminate carryover. At the same time, 
a liquid injection system controlling flow, composition, droplet 
size, etc., needs to be developed. Hopefully, enough informa­
tion and possibly expertise can be found to facilitate the de­
velopment of a workable system capable of maximizing the 
benefits of wet compression in the process compressor. 
CONCLUSION 
The many aspects of a large equipment revamp, as seen from 
the plant engineering level, have been presented. A great deal 
of credit has to go to the original equipment manufacturers. 
Their expertise and aggressive attitude toward the project com­
pletion and troubleshooting were critical to its success. The 
contribution of inhouse specialists, after market suppliers, and 
independent consultants in both design and quality assurance 
roles is also recognized. Finally, the effective definition of the 
goals and coordination of the available resources was critical to 
the achievement of the desired results. 
A general overview of the project reveals many phases. First, 
there was an incubation phase wherein the ideas were gener­
ated and plant tests were performed. Outside and after market 
suppliers, as well as OEMs, were contacted to determine their 
capabilities. Second, there was a development phase where 
the manufacturers were given a specific scope and contracted 
to develop it. Future implementation of the rerate was en­
visioned. Problems and constraints were planned for in ad­
vance. Measures for quality control and assurance were agreed 
upon. The manufacturers' designs, from system performance 
to blade packet resonances, were reviewed and approved prior 
to any release for manufacturing. Each vendor's scope of supply 
was detailed and finalized. Third, there was the manufacturing 
stage. Schedule and quality of the components were monitored 
at each specified step. Problems were confronted and resolved 
as expeditiously as possible. Detailed planning for the installa­
tion and startup took place. Arrangements were made for labor, 
service support, materials, tools, cranes, etc. Fourth, was the 
implementation phase. The equipment was revamped. Prob­
lems were resolved to ensure adherence to the shutdown 
schedule as well as high quality. This is where good planning 
and the manufacturer's emergency response capability paid off. 
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The train was then started up. Accurate and expedient trouble­
shooting and experience in using the right tools for analysis 
could avoid wasted time and energy. Finally, there was an 
evaluation phase, performance testing and evaluation of data. 
Careful acquisition of accurate data, especially with built-in 
inaccuracies due to normal process plant operation, was ex­
tremely important for producing meaningful results. Formulas 
for the calculational analysis of performance followed the AS ME 
PTC-10 Compressors and Exhausters Power Test codes as 
closely as possible. This final evaluation phase is continuing 
on, even after the specified performance goals have been met 
to become the incubation phase for the next generation of 
performance and reliability improvements. 
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